CSRF Protection

How the kit stops other sites from making changes with a signed-in user's cookies, and how to allow webhooks.

Another site can make a signed-in user's browser send requests to your app, cookies included (cross-site request forgery). The kit rejects those requests before any handler runs.

This page is part of the Security documentation.

What Is Protected

RequestProtected byResponse when cross-site
Page actions (Form, useForm, action in *.server.ts)Void itself403 Forbidden
POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE to /api/*apps/web/middleware/04.api-origin.ts (kit-owned)403 { "error": "Forbidden" }
/api/auth/* (Better Auth)Better Auth's trusted originsBetter Auth's own response
GET, HEAD, OPTIONS to /api/*Nothing: they must not change dataPasses

How the Check Works

A write to /api/* is rejected when either:

  • the browser says Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site, or
  • it sends an Origin header that differs from the request URL's origin (scheme, host and port), including Origin: null.

Same-origin is the URL the request arrived at, never SITE_URL or X-Forwarded-* headers. So custom domains, workers.dev and preview URLs all work without configuration.

Requests with neither header pass: they come from curl, other servers or webhooks, not from a browser carrying a user's cookies. They still reach your handler unauthenticated, so every handler must check the session (or a signature) itself.

Allowing a Webhook

Payment providers and other services post to your app from their own servers. Most send no Origin and pass already. If one sends browser-like headers, allow its path in apps/web/config/security.config.ts (yours to edit):

export const securityConfig = {
// …
crossSiteApiPaths: ['/api/webhooks/stripe'],
} satisfies SecurityConfig;
  • Entries are path prefixes matched on whole segments: /api/webhooks allows /api/webhooks/stripe but not /api/webhooks-old.
  • An allowed path accepts writes from any site, so its handler must verify the provider's signature before doing anything.
  • Don't allow a path that relies on the user's session cookie.

Common Pitfalls

  • A GET handler that changes data (GET /api/unsubscribe?id=…) is open to any site: an <img> tag is enough. Use POST for changes.
  • Calling your API from another frontend (a separate marketing site, a mobile web view on another origin) gets 403. Serve it from the same origin, or give that endpoint its own token-based auth and allowlist the path.
  • CORS doesn't replace this check. CORS controls who can read a response; a cross-site form post is sent without asking. Add hono/cors per handler only for public read APIs.
  • Relying on the check for authorization: it only stops other sites. A signed-in user calling your API directly passes, so authorize inside every handler.

Next: Coding Agents →